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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
TRACFONE WIRELESS, INC. 
vs. 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant 
Appellant/Cross-Respondent, 
THE STATE OF IDAHO and the IDAHO 
EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS 
COMMISSIONS, 
And 
Defendants/Counterclaimants 
Respondents. 
ADA COUNTY and THE BOARD OF ADA 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, and IDAHO 
ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES, INC., 
Interveners/Respondents 
Cross-Appellants. 
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Ada County Case No. 2012-10005 
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Appealed from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho 
in and for the County of Ada 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
TracFone Wireless, Inc. ("TracFone") - the largest provider of prepaid wireless service in 
the United States has consistently failed to remit the statutorily required 911 fee ("E911 Fee") 
as authorized by the Emergency Communications Act ("Act") since it began offering its services 
in Idaho in 1997. 1 In an attempt to justify its non-remittance, TracFone continues to make the 
same argument to this Court as it did to the District Court below - that TracFone, even though it 
provides the exact same services to its customers as other wireless providers is exempt from 
the Act's E911 Fee collection and remittance requirements simply because it resells those 
services on a prepaid basis.2 
1 TracFone spends the first portion of its Appellant's Reply Brief and Cross-Respondent's Brief 
("Response Brief') arguing that the Counties "immediately misstate the facts salient to this 
dispute" by making the following statement in their Cross-Appellants' Joint Brief: "Since being 
allowed to operate in Idaho, TracFone has refused to remit the statutorily required emergency 
communications fee .... " Response Brief, p. 1. TracFone argues that through this statement, the 
Counties have alleged that they "possess the power to determine what entities are 'allowed to 
operate in Idaho."' Id. The Counties' statement, like the remainder of their Brief, says nothing 
of the sort. The Counties are aware that the federal government has authority regarding mobile 
radio communications, and have never stated or implied that this obligation falls to local 
authorities. 
2 Another matter worth brief mention is that by citing Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938), 
TracFone again raises the notion that issues regarding statutory construction should be resolved 
in favor of the taxpayer. While the Counties have objected to TracFone's assertion of taxpayer 
status in other briefings filed in this case, it is discussed here in answer to TracFone's assertion 
that the IAC did not raise the issue before the District Court. See Response Brief, pp. 21-25. In 
fact, the IAC did raise this issue during oral argument before the District Court. 01/04/13 Tr. p. 
170, 11. 7-25; p. 171, 11. 1-5. In any event, there has been no finding in this case that TracFone is 
a taxpayer, so its conclusory assertion should not be given credence. Further, TracFone's 
additional assertion that the IAC is the "only party contesting the taxing nature of the E-911 fee" 
is incorrect. Response Brief, p. 21, fn. 15. Ada County made its own arguments on the subject, 
and also joined the IAC's arguments, in its Respondent Ada County's Brief. Respondent Ada 
County's Brief, p. 14, n. 7; p. 1, n. 1. 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
In its Response Brief, TracFone continues to paint an incomplete picture of the relevant 
facts and law by focusing this Court's attention on a few words taken from the Act and carefully 
selected sentences from pertinent case law. By doing so, TracFone ignores the dictates of this 
Court and leaves huge factual and legal gaps, and consequently offers no substantive arguments 
addressing the Counties' position that the District Court erred by holding that TracFone is not a 
certain specialized mobile radio provider pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-4802(15), even though it 
is designated as a covered carrier by the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") in 
47 C.F.R. § 20.18. 
Ada County and the Idaho Association of Counties ("IAC") file this Cross-Appellants' 
Joint Reply Brief3 in further support of their position that TracFone is a wireless carrier as 
defined by Idaho Code § 31-4802(15), and is thus a telecommunications provider pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 31-4802(13)(b) and subject to the E91 l Fee collection and remittance duties of the 
Act. 4 
II. ARGUMENT 
As has been the case since the start of this litigation, TracFone makes the analysis of 
Idaho Code§ 31-4802(15), and thus§ 31-4802(13)(b), more difficult than it needs to be. As 
used in the statute, "mobile radio providers" simply means those providers of mobile radio in the 
generic sense (providers of communications based on radio frequencies). And, "certain 
3 Throughout this Cross-Appellants' Joint Reply Brief, the IAC and Ada County will be 
collectively referred to as "Counties." 
4 In light of the position of the parties set forth in the Stipulated Motion to Augment the Record 
on file with this Court, the IAC will not address the portion of TracFone's Response Brief 
concerning the allegation that the IAC's Cross-Appeal is improper. 
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specialized mobile radio providers" are simply those mobile radio providers identified by the 
FCC in 47 C.F.R. § 20.18. 
TracFone convinced the District Court to follow its incorrect and hyper-technical 
argument that the actual language in Idaho Code § 31-4802(15) "certain specialized mobile 
radio providers" - really means "Specialized Mobile Radio Systems," or "SMRS," as defined in 
a section of the Code of Federal Regulations ("C.F.R.") that is not specifically referred to in the 
state statute. As the Counties have shown in their Cross-Appellants' Joint Brief and now below, 
the unambiguous statutory language clearly refers to the common usage of the words, and 
TracFone's attempts to force an unreferenced C.F.R. definition into the Idaho statute fail. 5 
A. TracFone Leaves Out Significant Portions of the History of "Specialized Mobile 
Radio Systems." 
In an attempt to convince this Court that "certain specialized mobile radio providers" is a 
technical term, TracFone provides an extremely abridged and incorrect version of the history of 
Specialized Mobile Radio services, 6 stating: 
For the benefit of the Court, TracFone sees merit in identifying some history 
regarding the types of services that are common to specialized mobile radio 
services, as such a discussion will assist the Court's understanding of how 
5 If this Court were to adopt TracFone's position that the words "certain specialized mobile radio 
providers" actually means "Specialized Mobile Radio Systems," and that "Specialized Mobile 
Radio Systems" only includes dispatch services, the result would be that "public safety providers 
like police and fire departments and medical rescue teams" would be deemed "wireless carriers" 
under Idaho Code § 31-4802(15). See TracFone' s Response Brief, p. 3 3. This argument is 
nonsensical, as the result would be that the providers of public safety services would be required 
to collect E911 Fees from, and remit to, themselves. 
6 The acronym "SMRS" stands for "Specialized Mobile Radio Systems," not "Specialized 
Mobile Radio Services" as used by TracFone. See National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissioners v. Federal Communications Commission, 525 F.2d 630, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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markedly different TracFone's services are from those encompassed by the SMRS 
category .... 
Response Brief, p. 33 (emphasis in original). 
TracFone then provides two separate one-paragraph citations that purport to fully set 
forth this history. Id., pp. 33-34. As one can imagine, the over 40-year history of such complex 
technology cannot be summed up in two short paragraphs. Therefore, at this point, it is worth 
revisiting the history of the federal regulations and case law that existed prior to and 
contemporaneous with the time the Idaho Legislature amended Idaho Code § 31-4802 to add the 
definition of "wireless carrier," in order to fill in the extensive blanks left by TracFone so that the 
Court can better understand the full nature of mobile radio services in the generic sense, and also 
the technical term "Specialized Mobile Radio Systems."7 
The logical starting point for this discussion is the seminal case of National Association 
of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. Federal Communications Commission, 525 F.2d 630 
(D.C. Cir. 1976). In 1974, the FCC issued an order, later modified in 1975 ("1975 Order") that 
allocated the frequency spectrum in the 806-921 MHz band, and regulated the future use of that 
spectrum, to land mobile radio service, which is "radio communication services, based on land, 
where either the transmitting or receiving station is mobile." Id. p. 634. At the time, land mobile 
radio services consisted of two general types public services, which were operated by common 
carriers and made available to the public (the most common type being radio telephone services 
that interconnected with existing telephone systems), and private services, which included all 
7 The Counties' history is taken from various D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals cases brought 
against the FCC over the last 40 years. 
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other mobile radio operations which were not subject to common carrier regulations (prior to the 
1975 Order, private services consisted of, but were not limited to, predominantly dispatch 
services operated by police and fire departments, and taxicab companies for their own use). Id. 
The FCC's 1975 Order had three objectives pertaining to land mobile radio services. 
First, it allocated 40 MHz of the total 115 MHz on the 900 MHz band "to the development of a 
nationwide, broad-band, 'cellular' mobile radio communications system," which would be a 
public common carrier system expanding the capacity of radio telephone service. Id. In addition 
to providing radio telephone service, the cellular systems were allowed to also engage in 
dispatch operations. Id. 
The 1975 Order also allocated 30 MHz on the 900 MHz band to private services, to be 
licensed to operators in the public safety, industrial and land transportation areas "who wish to 
obtain a license to operate a station, either for their own private purposes, or, with several other 
eligibles, on a non-profit, cost-sharing basis." Id. Most importantly, the Order also created a 
new category of private mobile operators who would be eligible for licensing on this 30 MHz, 
called Specialized Mobile Radio Systems ("SMRS"). Id. SMRS operators would operate on a 
commercial basis to provide services to third parties on a for-profit basis. Id. "Because it 
[sought] to utilize a profit motive to speed development and refinement of mobile radio 
technologies, the Commission conclude[ d] that SMRS should not be subject to the common 
carrier regulations ... and that state certification of SMRS should be preempted." Id., pp. 634-
635. These entrepreneurial mobile operators SMRS would share access to this allocated 
spectrum with the other private operators that consisted primarily of dispatch services which the 
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operator would provide to himself, such as police or taxicab services. Id. at 639. By placing 
SMRS with the private operators and likewise classifying them as non-common carriers, the 
FCC ensured that SMRS would not fall under the same stringent regulations as common carriers 
and avoided state regulation. 8 Id., p. 640. 
Contrary to TracFone's assertions, from the inception of SMRS, the courts and the FCC 
clearly spoke in terms of multiple types of SMRS rather than a single type of mobile radio 
provider (i.e. dispatch providers). This concept was further developed in P & R Temmer v. 
Federal Communications Commission, 743 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1984), which also shows the 
continuing technological evolution taking place at the time: 
Land mobile radio services are radio communications based on land, where either 
the transmitting or receiving station is mobile .... Land mobile radio services are 
of two general types. Public services are operated by common carrier licensees 
and made available to members of the public. The most common type of public 
services are radio telephone services which interconnect with existing telephone 
systems .... This type has recently become popularized as "cordless telephones" 
or "car telephones" although, strictly speaking, they are not telephones since they 
are merely connected to a telephone system by a radio link. The other type of land 
mobile radio service is known as private services and includes all those not 
subject to common carrier regulation. These include dispatch services such as 
those operated by police and fire departments and taxicab companies .... They 
also extend, however, to services provided to a limited group of users by third 
party operators. It is this last group that is involved in this case. 
In the private land mobile services area, the Commission adopted policies that 
made it possible for entrepreneurs seeking to operate radio systems for others on a 
commercial basis to obtain their own system licenses. These commercially 
operated private radio systems became known as "Specialized Mobile Radio 
Systems" ("SMRS"). 
8 The third effect of the 197 5 Order was the designation of the remaining 45 MHz of the total 
115 MHz allocation for reserve and future growth. Id., p. 635. 
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Id. at 921-922. 
It is again evident that the concept of SMRS was one in which multiple types of systems 
were contemplated, rather than a single type of mobile radio operation. 
The primary purpose for classifying SMRS as a private land mobile radio service was 
that the FCC did not want SMRS deemed a common carrier and thus subject to stringent federal 
and state regulations. However, by 1997, industry technology had evolved to the point where the 
FCC determined that further regulation was required. The court in Chadmoore Communications, 
Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 113 F.3d 235 (D.C. Cir. 1997), described this 
evolution as follows: 
Specialized mobile radio ("SMR") systems are commercially operated private 
communication systems that employ mobile transmitting and/or receiving 
stations. In the beginning, these systems were used primarily to provide highly 
localized services, such as the radio dispatching of police cars and taxicabs. In 
recent years, however, emerging SMR technologies have enabled licensees to 
offer their customers sophisticated voice and data transmission services over 
extensive areas ( e.g., two-way acknowledgment paging, credit card authorization, 
automatic vehicle location, remote database access, and voice mail) .... 
Originally, the FCC issued licenses by ascertaining whether an application 
satisfied certain criteria. Licensees of the 280 SMR-only channels were assigned 
either one or five channels at a time on a station-by-station basis. As a general 
rule, stations operating on the same channel must be a minimum of seventy miles 
apart. With the advent of new technologies, however, SMR service operators 
became interested in packaging large numbers of stations for the purpose of 
creating systems that could serve vast geographic areas. Because of the expense 
and complexity associated with the creation of these systems, the FCC modified 
its regulations to make applicants eligible for "extended implementation 
authority," which would extend the periods within which the applicants' wide-
area systems would have to be completed .... 
In August 1993, Congress amended the Communications Act to create two 
categories of mobile service-commercial mobile radio service ("CMRS") and 
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private mobile radio service; and it directed the Commission to implement these 
categories in its regulations and provide for comparable regulation of substantially 
similar CMRS systems. The FCC subsequently classified any wide-area SMR 
system offering interconnected service for profit, such as the one Chadmoore 
proposed, as a CMRS. 
The FCC then began to amend its existing regulations to treat SMR and CMRS 
systems alike; and in its Further NP RM, the FCC initiated a rulemaking to 
implement a framework for licensing SMRs that would facilitate development of 
wide-area, multi-channel SMR systems in competition with cellular and 
broadband personal communications services systems. The notice observed that 
the FCC was relying increasingly on competitive bidding for the licensing of new 
SMR services. 
Chadmoore Communications, Inc., 113 F .3d at 23 7 (internal citations omitted). 
In 1997, the FCC created two categories of mobile radio service - private mobile radio 
service and, importantly, the new category of Commercial Mobile Radio Services ("CMRS"). 
The FCC moved SMRS into the newly-created CMRS, meaning that CMRS was now a subset of 
SMRS. CMRS grew out of SMRS and, in essence, became a for-profit SMRS. Moreover, it was 
the FCC's intention that SMRS and CMRS merged and were subject to the same regulations. 
By the mid-2000's, courts and the FCC were still speaking of types of systems as 
opposed to a single type of mobile radio provider when discussing SMRS and CMRS. Also 
during that time, the FCC issued further orders that reconfigured the spectrum's 800 MHz band 
in order to eliminate interference with public safety communications. 
Under the plan ... 800 MHz licensees which operate Specialized Mobile Radio 
(SMR) Systems that broadcast signals from a base station antenna situated at a 
high elevation, will be segregated from licensees who operate Enhanced 
Specialized Mobile Radio (ESMR) systems, which use smaller and more 
numerous base stations and a cellular network architecture. 
Mobile Relay Assocs. v. Federal Communication Commission, 457 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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The D.C. Circuit in A1obile Relay discussed the origins of the FCC licensing in the 800 
MHz band spectrum and the creation of Specialized Mobile Radio Systems, and went on to 
discuss the evolution of enhanced SMR systems. 
Later 800 MHz licensees developed "enhanced" SMR, or ESMR, systems. In an 
ESMR system the system operator divides the service area into several multiple 
antenna sites, placed at a lower altitude, each of which is called a "cell" and 
operates at a lower power and covers a smaller area than an SMR high-site 
antenna. Unlike the SMR system, in which the operator assigns the user a single 
channel for the entire service area, in the ESMR system the same channel may be 
used in non-adjacent cells by different users at the same time. As the mobile unit 
moves from one cell to another, the communications link is automatically 
"handed off' to the next cell and the channel switches with no noticeable effect on 
the user. The ESMR system can support a greater number of users than the SMR 
system and, because it allows for a frequency's reuse within the same system, is a 
more efficient--and therefore more profitable--use of spectrum .... 
As ESMR system use increased, so too did interference with the high-site public 
safety systems in the 800 MHz band. The source of the interference was the 
overlap of the different architectures and their operations' proximity on the 
spectrum, particularly where a public safety mobile or portable radio was within 
an ESMR transmitter's range. Specifically, public safety radio users experienced 
coverage loss in areas where adequate coverage previously existed within their 
site-based system. For example, if an en route police officer or firefighter near 
the outermost border of his site-based network's range attempted to communicate 
by portable radio with a distant base station and was also within the range of a 
low-power, low-elevation cell site using an adjacent band frequency, his 
communication could be disrupted and he could miss a critical transmission from 
his base station or be unable to call for assistance. 
Id., 4-5. 
Further emphasizing the various types of SMRS in operation, the court noted that 
"traditional cellular telephone systems are similar to ESMR systems in terms of their system 
architectures and the service they provide to consumers but they operate in a different spectrum 
band and use somewhat different technology .... Unlike other cellular telephone providers, 
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intervenors Nextel and Southern LINC operate in the 800 MHz band." Id., p. 4, n. 2. At the 
time, Nextell, a cellular telephone provider, was the largest 800 MHz licensee and ESMR system 
operator in the United States. Id., p. 5. 
As can be seen, and contrary to TracFone's continued assertions, the FCC and the courts 
interpreting the FCC's orders frequently discuss mobile radio providers in the generic sense. 
Further, the FCC and courts also discuss the technical term SMRS as encompassing much more 
than a single type of service, as clearly evidenced by the fact that Nextell, a provider of cellular 
telephone service, was an SMRS operator. Not being subject to extensive state and federal 
regulations allowed SMRS to evolve extensively over the years, until the FCC determined that 
regulations were needed, resulting in the creation of CMRS which clearly grew out of the 
previously existing SMRS. Since TracFone has repeatedly admitted that it is a CMRS, given the 
above history, TracFone would be considered an SMRS by virtue of being a CMRS. 
B. TracFone Offers No Valid Argument that the Statutory Language "Certain 
Specialized Mobile Radio Providers" is a Technical Term. 
As the Counties have continuously argued, the Idaho Legislature used the unambiguous 
words "certain specialized mobile radio providers" in the generic sense, with the intended result 
being as long as a specialized mobile radio provider was specifically identified by the FCC as a 
covered carrier in 47 C.F.R. § 20.18, then that certain provider is a wireless carrier and thus a 
telecommunications provider under Idaho Code § 31-4802(13 )(b ). 
Despite these valid arguments, TracFone devotes a portion of its Response Brief to the 
argument that the Counties have offered no "common-meaning explanation of 'specialized 
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mobile radio"' and that the Counties do not take a cognizable position on the meaning of the 
word "specialized." Response Brief, pp. 30-37. However, and especially in light of the above-
discussed history,9 it is common knowledge that "mobile radio providers" broadly refers to 
providers of communications systems which are based on radio frequencies. Further, the 
Counties have continuously asserted, and do again here, that the word "specialized" was used in 
the generic sense to describe all types of mobile radio providers which are specifically identified 
by the FCC in 4 7 C.F.R. § 20.18 that connect the public to 911 services. 10 
When drafting the definition of "wireless carrier" located in Idaho Code § 31-4802(15), 
the Legislature chose to incorporate the lowercase words "certain specialized mobile radio 
providers" and did not use the capitalized, specific term "Specialized Mobile Radio Systems" as 
the FCC did when it created such Systems in 1975. See National Association of Regulatory 
Utility Commissioners, 525 F.2d 630. By choosing these exact words, the Legislature 
incorporated into the definition of "wireless carrier" those certain specialized mobile radio 
providers specifically identified by the FCC as covered carriers in 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 and any 
successor to such rule. 
Courts also differentiate between the term "Specialized Mobile Radio Systems" and the 
broader, generic "mobile radio systems." For instance, when discussing the appropriateness of 
9 See discussion of land mo bile radio services, supra. 
10 Importantly, the Legislature specifically included the language "and any successor to such 
rule" in order to take into account the fact that mobile radio providers and 911 services would 
evolve. In other words, the Legislature did not intend that individual terms used in the Idaho 
statutes and Federal Regulations be seized upon as if set in stone, so that a clearly covered entity 
that entered the market at a later date would never be included in the statutory scheme. 
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allocating 40MHz to the development of a cellular mobile radio system, the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals stated, "In light of the wide ranging arguments as to appropriate spectrum width, we 
cannot say that the allocation of 40 MHz to this experimental mobile radio system was either 
unreasonably large or unreasonably small." National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissioners, 525 F.2d at 636 (emphasis added). This is the same Court (in the same case) 
that discussed the creation of "Specialized Mobile Radio Systems" by the FCC. "Such 
substantial domination would be undesirable both because it would weaken incentives for 
development of improved mobile radio systems, and because it would enhance the already 
enormous overall economic power as the Bell System." Id., 637 (emphasis added). The D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals also discussed and defined the general term "land mobile radio 
services" in its cases discussing SMRS. See Id. at 634; P & R Temmer, 743 F.2d at 921-922. 
The Legislature evidenced foresight by choosing to use the words "certain specialized 
mobile radio providers" in the generic sense, as the clear intent of the Act set forth in Idaho Code 
§ 31-4801 is to cast a big net in order to encompass all providers of services that connect an 
individual dialing 911 to a public safety answering point. If the Legislature used technical 
language in the statute - language whose meaning could change over time - the Legislature 
would have potentially left out providers who should be subject to the Act and thus limited the 
funding sources available for the state's E911 dispatch systems. 
Clearly, the Legislature intended for all providers of services that connect an individual 
dialing 911 to a dispatch center to be subject to the Fee collection and remittance duties of the 
Act, and would have had no legitimate reason for limiting those wireless carriers who would be 
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covered by the Act. The only limiting language would come from the FCC itself - the 
governmental entity which would have the most knowledge regarding the ever-changing 
technology - through 47 C.F.R. § 20.18. Consequently, only those "certain specialized mobile 
radio providers designated as covered carriers by the federal communications commission in 4 7 
C.F.R. § 20.18 and any successor to such rule" are considered wireless carriers. 11 
Given the above history and the language found in 47 C.F.R. § 20.18, both now and at the 
time the Legislature amended Idaho Code § 31-4802(13), TracFone is and was a designated 
covered carrier by the FCC. 
C. TracFone is a Certain Specialized Mobile Radio Provider Designated as a Covered 
Carrier by the FCC, and is thus a Wireless Carrier Subject to the Act. 
Given that the technology in this field is highly evolving, it makes sense that the FCC and 
its regulations would also evolve in order to stay current with technology. In reviewing the 
evolution of 4 7 C.F.R. § 20.18 in particular, it becomes clear that the Idaho Legislature was not 
referring to the "Specialized Mobile Radio Systems" as created by the FCC in 1975, but rather to 
the generic, more broadly defined mobile radio providers. 
In 2003, the Legislature added the definition of "wireless carrier" found in Idaho Code 
§ 31-4802(15) to the Emergency Communications Act. See Respondent Ada County's Brief, pp. 
2-3. When this definition was added to the Idaho Code, the relevant version of 47 C.F.R. 
§ 20.18, as referenced in the definition, was the October 1, 2002 version. The stated purpose of 
these federal rules, both in 2002 and today, was "to set forth the requirements and conditions 
11 In addition to cellular licensees and personal communications service licensees. See I.C. 
§ 31-4802(15). 
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applicable to commercial mobile radio service providers." 4 7 C.F.R. § 20.1 (2002); (2010). 
Section 20.18 applied then, as today, to 911 service. In 2002, the scope of the section was as 
follows: 
The following requirements are only applicable to Broadband Personal 
Communications Services12 (part 24, subpart E of this chapter), Cellular Radio 
Telephone Service (part 22, subpart H of this chapter), and Geographic Area 
Specialized Mobile Radio Services 13 and Incumbent Wide Area SMR Licensees 
in the 800 MHz and 900 MHz bands (included in part 90, subpart S of this 
chapter). 
47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2002). 
At that time, CMRS, as a subset of SMRS, need not have been specifically listed in 47 
C.F.R. § 20.18, as the stated purpose of the regulation was to set forth the requirements and 
conditions applicable to commercial mobile radio service providers. Clearly, all of the types of 
services specifically identified in 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 in 2002, and today, are CMRS, since the 
requirements and conditions are to apply to CMRS. 
The 2005 version of 47 C.F.R. § 20.18, which was applicable when the Legislature added 
Idaho Code§ 31-4802(13)(c) and (d) in 2007, applied to the following: 
The following requirements are only applicable to Broadband Personal 
Communications Services (part 24, subpart E of this chapter), Cellular Radio 
Telephone Service (part 22, subpart H of this chapter), and Geographic Area 
Specialized Mobile Radio Services and Incumbent Wide Area SMR Licensees in 
the 800 MHz and 900 MHz bands (included in part 90, subpart S of this chapter) 
12 Broadband Personal Communications Services ("PCS") operate in the 1850-1990 MHz 
spectrum range and are used in mobile voice and data services, including cell phones, text 
messaging and Internet service. See FCC Encyclopedia; www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia. 
13 The "wide-area, multi-channel SMR systems in competition with cellular and broadband 
personal communications services systems" referred to in the Chadmoore case. See Chadmoore 
Communications, Inc., 113 F.3d at 237. 
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and those entities that offer voice service to consumers by purchasing airtime or 
capacity at wholesale rates from these licensees, collectively CMRS providers. In 
addition, service providers in these enumerated services are subject to the 
following requirements solely to the extent that they offer real-time, two way 
switched voice service that is interconnected with the public switched network 
and utilize an in-network switching facility which enables the provider to reuse 
frequencies and accomplish seamless hand-offs of subscriber calls. 
47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2005) (emphasis added). The FCC made this change to specifically include 
resellers like TracFone. As of 2005, without a doubt, TracFone was a covered carrier. 
Then, as of October 1, 2010, the FCC removed from 4 7 C.F.R. § 20.18 all references to 
"Specialized Mobile Radio Systems" and anything close to that term. Today, 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 
specifically applies to all CMRS providers, with the exception of mobile satellite service 
operators. 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2013). The for-profit technology has now arrived to the point 
where SMRS providing interconnectivity is regulated as a type of CMRS by the FCC. See 47 
CFR § 20.9. 14 
D. TracFone Provides No Valid Argument In Support of the District Court's Denial of 
Ada County's Motions to Strike Portions of the Baldino, Lloyd and Lane Affidavits. 
Since TracFone has failed to make any substantive arguments in response to Ada 
14 Even if this Court determines that, as used in the statute, "certain specialized mobile radio 
providers" is a technical term, given the history of "Specialized Mobile Radio Systems" as 
outlined above, TracFone is still a "wireless carrier" pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-4802(15). 
CMRS (that which TracFone claims it is) was in its formative stages at the time the Legislature 
passed the definition of "wireless carrier" in 2003, and was an evolving category of SMRS that 
consisted of profit-based SMRS entities. Now that market forces and technology have placed 
CMRS in the forefront of FCC regulation, SMRS and CMRS are treated by the FCC as one and 
the same. This is precisely why the Legislature allowed for the evolution of 4 7 C.F .R. § 20.18 in 
Idaho Code§ 31-4802(15). Both in 2003 and today, CMRS (including TracFone) were "certain" 
SMR providers in the sense the word is often used, meaning "fixed" or "of a specific but 
unspecified character." Merriam-Webster. com. Meriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 28 Oct. 2014. 
http://www.meriam-webster.com/dictionary/certain. 
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County's appeal of the District Court's rulings regarding certain of its Motions to Strike, Ada 
County will rely primarily on its arguments set forth in the Cross-Appellants' Joint Brief, 15 but 
offers the following comments below. 16 
1. The District Court's Decision not to Strike the Baldino Affidavit Was in Error. 
Ada County's first Objection and Motion to Strike (R. pp. 908-913) was directed at the 
Baldino Affidavit. R. pp. 852-884. Ms. Baldino's Affidavit explains that in her capacity as a 
paralegal employed by TracFone's counsel, she was instructed by one of her supervising 
attorneys to conduct an internet search regarding certain FCC licensing information for 
TracFone. R. p. 853. Through her Affidavit, Ms. Baldino testified that she was unable to locate 
any such FCC licensing records. 
Ada County's objection was simply that Ms. Baldino was not a proper sponsonng 
witness since she could not lay the necessary evidentiary foundation for the non-existence of 
FCC records. Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Evidence 803(7) and/or ( 10), testimony establishing 
the absence of a filed record requires actual knowledge about filing practices and procedures. 
This requires greater familiarity with the records, compared to the requirements for establishing 
the foundation for the existence of records. The Baldino Affidavit includes no basis for her 
familiarity and knowledge regarding FCC record filing practices and procedures. 
Therefore, Ada County submits that the determination by the District Court to admit the 
Baldino Affidavit was an abuse of its discretion and that decision should be overruled. 
15 See Cross-Appellants' Joint Brief, pp. 21-31. 
16 As the IAC did not cross-appeal the District Court's decisions as to Ada County's Motions to 
Strike, the IAC does not join Ada County's arguments as set forth in Section II.D. herein. 
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2. The District Court's Decision not to Strike the Llovd and Lang Affidavits Was in 
Error. 
Ada County's other Objections and Motions to Strike (R. pp. 1720-1727) were directed at 
TracFone's counsel's affidavit ("Lloyd Affidavit") (R. pp. 1102-1672) and TracFone's Assistant 
General Counsel's affidavit ("Lang Affidavit") (R. pp. 1068-1101 ). Both Affidavits were 
submitted in support ofTracFone's motion to reconsider its summary judgment loss. 
The District Court initially struck both in their entirety. R. pp. 1842-1843. However, 
fourteen days later, via a footnote in its supporting memorandum (R. p. 1876), TracFone 
resubmitted the stricken Affidavits in support of its Motion for Certification for appeal to this 
Court. R. pp. 1860-1864. Ada County objected to the resubmission, but this time the District 
Court allowed both Affidavits into evidence, explaining that the "Supreme Court is going to have 
it anyway." 01/31/14 Tr. p. 185, 11. 10-12. Ada County cross-appealed the decision, submitting 
that the District Court abused its discretion. 
In its briefing, TracFone asserts that it resubmitted the Affidavits so that the District 
Court could consider the contents and determine that there are "substantial grounds for 
difference of opinion" as to statutory interpretation. Response Brief, p. 39. However, as 
previously argued by Ada County, the statutes at issue are not ambiguous and as such, there is no 
reason to seek evidence outside the wording of the statutes themselves. 
TracFone also asserts that Ada County should be prohibited from cross-appealing the 
District Court's decision to consider the Affidavits because TracFone, rather than Ada County, 
appealed. TracFone's argument seems to be that Ada County should be precluded from cross-
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appealing, smce it has "taken advantage of this interlocutory appeal to appeal [its] own 
disagreements with the District Court." Response Brief, p. 39. TracFone cites no rule or 
decision in support of its premise that Ada County cannot raise issues on cross-appeal. Since 
Ada County properly raised these objections below and timely cross-appealed the District 
Court's ruling, TracFone's argument fails. 
Furthermore, as Ada County has previously submitted, neither of the Affidavits are 
admissible. This Court has explained: "[T]he accepted rule in most jurisdictions is that the 
beliefs of one legislator do not establish that the legislature intended something other than its 
express declaration." Gillihan v. Gump, 140 Idaho 264,268, 92 P.3d 514,519 (2004) (abrogated 
on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 231 P.3d 524 (2009)). Given that a 
single legislator's beliefs as to legislative intent may not be considered by the courts, the beliefs 
of one of the litigant's attorneys, a volunteer commission member's comments and an internet 
pamphlet are hardly authority as to a court's legal interpretation of a statute. 
TracFone also argues, based upon a misconstruction ofldaho Rule of Evidence 105, that 
the Lloyd and Lang Affidavits are admissible because they were submitted for a different 
purpose the second time. TracFone then undermines its own argument, explaining that it first 
introduced the Lloyd and Lang Affidavits to support its "statutory construction and 
interpretation" argument. Response Brief, p. 39 (emphasis added). TracFone explains that the 
"other purpose" for which it introduced the Affidavits the second time was to show that "there 
were 'substantial grounds' for a difference of opinion on the underlying statutory interpretation 
issues." Id. ( emphasis added). Thus, even though TracFone argues that it resubmitted the 
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Affidavits for another purpose, its explanation is that both submissions were for statutory 
interpretation purposes. 
TracFone's argument also fails because Idaho Rule of Evidence 105 does not mean what 
TracFone submits. Rule 105 reads: 
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not 
admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon 
request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury 
accordingly. 
Entitled "Limited Admissibility," the Rule is generally applicable to circumstances 
involving co-parties. For example, where evidence is admissible against party "A" but not party 
"B," this Rule directs the court to instruct the jury that the evidence can only be considered 
against "A" and not "B." The Rule may also be applied where evidence is admitted against party 
"A" but is to be used only for the purpose of evidencing "A's" ability to form intent to commit a 
crime, not to prove he/she actually committed the crime. See State v. Dopp, 129 Idaho 157 (Ct. 
App. 1996). Again, because TracFone resubmitted the Affidavits for the same reason as it did 
originally, the Rule does not apply. 
TracFone has failed to provide this Court with a legal basis for upholding the District 
Court's decision to admit the Lloyd and Lang Affidavits. Accordingly, this Court should 
overturn the District Court's decision to admit the Affidavits. 
E. Attorney Fees on Cross-Appeal. 
The Counties request costs and attorney fees on Cross-Appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 
§§ 12-121, 12-123 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41. TracFone argues that the Counties have failed 
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to ask for attorney fees under the proper sections, but in a footnote 17 it concedes that this Court 
explained there is an "exception," and Idaho Code § 12-121 may apply where a governmental 
entity seeks attorney fees: 
The State seeks an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to sections 
12-117(1), 12-120(3), and 12-121. All three statutes are expressly applicable to 
the State, but they all only provide for the award of attorney fees to the prevailing 
party. 
Syringa Networks v. Idaho Dept. of Admin., 155 Idaho 55, 67-68, 305 P.3d 499, 511-512 (2013). 
Whether this is a proper rule or an "exception" under which a governmental entity may 
seek fees is a distinction without merit, and the Counties' reliance on Idaho Code § 12-121 is 
appropriate. This Court has explained that: 
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 specifies the procedure for requesting an award of 
attorney fees on appeal, and LC. § 12-121 allows an award of "reasonable 
attorney's fees to the prevailing party." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l) 
provides, "attorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by 
the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was 
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." 
Oregon Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 148 Idaho 47, 54, 218 P.3d 391, 398, 
(2009). 
Should the Counties prevail on Cross-Appeal, they submit there are certain issues that 
TracFone defended without foundation. The first is TracFone's argument that Ms. Baldino could 
lay proper foundation for the absence of FCC records in person or via affidavit. On appeal, 
TracFone argues (incorrectly) that the issues surrounding the Baldino Affidavit are moot, 
because the information it sought to admit is contained in another affidavit. But, the information 
17 Response Brief, p. 40, fn. 21. 
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is not included in the other affidavit. And rather than support its position in its appellate 
briefing, TracFone submits that if its mootness argument fails, this Court is invited to locate its 
briefing and arguments submitted below, and apply those on appeal. Response Brief, p. 38. 
TracFone also continues to argue that its counsel's beliefs about statutory intent, an 
internet pamphlet and comments included in the minutes of the volunteer IEEC committee are 
legal authority which must be considered by the District Court, and forwards that its 
resubmission of the already stricken Affidavits was allowable, because the second submission 
was for a different purpose than the first. Yet, in its briefing, TracFone admits both submissions 
were to support statutory interpretation arguments. 
Based on the above and the arguments made in the Cross-Appellants' Joint Brief, the 
Counties ask that attorney fees be awarded to them. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Idaho Legislature's intent was made clear when it adopted the Idaho Emergency 
Communications Act: 
[I]t is hereby declared that the intent and purpose of the provisions of this act are 
to ... [p]rovide authority to counties and 911 service areas to impose an 
emergency communications fee on the use of telephone lines, wireless, VoIP or 
other communications services that connect an individual dialing 911 to an 
established public safety answering point . ... 
Idaho Code§ 31-4801(2)(a) (emphasis added). 
With this codified intent in mind, and based on the arguments contained in the Cross-
Appellants' Joint Brief and herein, the Counties respectfully request that this Court reverse the 
District Court's determination that TracFone is not a wireless carrier pursuant to Idaho Code 
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§ 31-4802(15) and thus not a telecommunications provider pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 31-4802( 13 )(b ), and Ada County respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District 
Court's admission of the above Affidavits into evidence . 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this LD·_,_-day of February, 2015. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: 
Sherry A. Morgan 
James K. Dickinson-
Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys 
Attorneys for ADA COUNTY and the 
BOARD OF ADA COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS 
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, INC. 
By: 
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Richard H. Greener 
Thomas J. Lloyd III 
Greener Burke Shoemaker 
Oberrecht P.A. 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Mitchell F. Brecher 
Debra McGuire Mercer 
Greenburg Traurig, LLP 
2101 L Street, NW, Suite 1000 
Washington, DC 20037 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General 
Steven L. Olsen, Chief of Civil Litigation 
Shasta Kilminister-Hadley, Deputy Attorney General 
Statehouse, Room 210 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Michael J. Kane 
Michael Kane & Associates PLLC 
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